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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the question: “How does a client's information technology (IT) capability 
influence audit pricing?” Company data for the years 2004 through 2012 are employed. Firms 
appearing on the InformationWeek 500 (IW500) annual list of U.S. organizations with superior IT 
functions serve as a proxy for companies with superior IT capability. Our findings suggest that 
companies with superior IT capabilities incur higher levels of audit fees. In addition, as client size 
increases, the audit fees of firms with advanced IT capabilities increase at a greater rate than 
firms without such capabilities. These findings contrast with prior research by Chen et al. (2014) 
that found in the immediate post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period for the years 2004 through 
2007, client IT capability reduced audit fee increases. In addition, we replicate the Chen et al. 
(2014) results and find that IT capability did not influence audit fee increases during the sub­
sequent recession and recovery periods. Further, superior capability clients see smaller audit fee 
increases when exogenous shocks such as SOX regulations occur. These results suggest a revised 
interpretation of Chen et al. (2014) may be warranted. This study contributes to the literature by 
providing a more complete picture of how a client's IT capability affects audit fees.
1. Introduction
Accounting and information technology (IT) have become inexorably intertwined. Clients and auditors alike seek to leverage “big 
data” and advanced analytics throughout their operations (PWC, 2015). Accounting information systems are embedded within 
complex enterprise resource planning (ERP) software. Also, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires listed companies 
to file their financial statements via eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) (U.S. SEC, 2017). Big 4 audit firms are re­
sponding by expanding their IT auditing and consulting practices (Hermanson, 2009).
These changes create technological complexities and risk while simultaneously enabling enhanced analytics and controls. As a 
construct, IT capability reflects a company's capacity to marshal investments in people, processes and technologies in order to 
improve business performance (Dehning et al., 2003). Companies with advanced IT capabilities select the investments that best 
support their strategy from a myriad of potential IT expenditures. Having selected these IT priorities, they can successfully execute 
related projects and deploy new technologies within their organizations. There is, therefore, reason to believe that increased IT 
capability may allow for either a more cost-effective audit - stronger controls and internal information systems that support the 
auditor - or a more expensive audit - increased difficulties involved with auditing more advanced and complex IT systems.
☆ Data availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources noted in the article.
Prior research has studied the effect of IT capability on the external audit. This work focused exclusively on the immediate post- 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) period. Masli et al. (2010) suggest that specific IT investments in internal control-monitoring 
technology reduce the rate of audit fee increase. Also, during the immediate post-SOX period, for the years 2004 through 2007, 
companies with strong IT capabilities had slightly lower (9.1%) rates of audit fee increase than those without strong IT resources 
(Chen et al., 2014). We argue, however, that these findings may not extend beyond the immediate post-SOX era when public audit 
failures (for example, Enron Corporation, WorldCom, Tyco International, Adelphia Communications Corporation) generated severe 
market and regulatory responses, leading companies to deploy IT resources specifically targeted to addressing audit and internal 
control risks. Additionally, we are unaware of any research that explores how the client's IT capability impacts the actual level of 
audit fees incurred. This paper addresses the gap in prior research by exploring the broader question: How does a client's IT capability 
impact audit pricing?
The COBIT 5 (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology) framework recommends that firms align, plan and 
organize IT investments in support of their chosen business strategy (ISACA, 2017). Firms may gain sustainable advantage by uti­
lizing IT to develop business capabilities that are difficult for competitors to imitate or acquire (Mata et al., 1995). In particular, firms 
generate value by aligning their internal capabilities with their IT strategy, creating synergistic resources to respond to market, 
industry and supply chain forces (Nevo and Wade, 2010; Melville et al., 2004). For example, Mithas et al. (2012) find that “... firms 
have had greater success in achieving higher profitability through IT-enabled revenue growth than through IT-enabled cost reduction 
(pg. 205).” Absent the exogenous effect of SOX, whether firms with advanced IT capabilities choose to emphasize enhancing internal 
controls and audit efficiency among their many competing IT priorities remains an empirical question. In other words, when deciding 
where to invest in and implement IT resources, internal control is just one of the many options upon which a company can focus their 
efforts.
Even if strong IT capability has positive effects on a firm's value-generating capabilities and its internal controls, this does not 
automatically translate into increased audit affordability. For example, auditors may need to use more specialized and expensive 
resources with clients that routinely deploy new and advanced technology. Auditors also have more difficulty assessing risk in 
complex accounting systems (Abernathy et al., 2013).
Building upon prior work modeling factors influencing audit pricing (for example, Francis and Wang, 2005; Raghunandan and 
Rama, 2006; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Masli et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014), we analyze data on audit fees in relation to the 
company's IT capability. The data employed by this study comprises the population of SEC-registered U.S. companies audited for the 
years 2004 through 2012 with audit fees data compiled by Audit Analytics. Following prior research, SEC-registered companies cited 
in the annual InformationWeek 500 report (IW500) identifying U.S. companies with superior IT capabilities, are utilized as a proxy for 
firms with superior IT capabilities. These firms are compared to a propensity score matched sample of control firms. We find that 
superior client IT capability is associated with higher levels of audit fees, ceteris paribus.
Additional analysis suggests a reinterpretation may be warranted of the findings of Chen et al. (2014). Consistent with their study, 
we found that clients with advanced IT capabilities had a smaller increase in audit fees post-SOX for the time period 2004 through 
2007. The recession (years 2008 through 2009) and recovery (years 2010 through 2012) periods, however, reveal no statistically 
significant difference in audit fee changes when comparing clients with or without advanced IT capabilities. Additionally, we find 
that, while companies with advanced IT capabilities incurred higher levels of audit fees during the post-SOX period examined by 
Chen et al. (2014), they experienced smaller audit fee increases. These higher levels of audit fees remain consistent during the 
recession and recovery periods as well.
Finally, exploring various interaction effects between advanced IT capability and major audit fee determinants (Hay et al., 2006; 
Simunic, 1980), we find that superior IT capability positively moderates the impact of client size on audit fees. Specifically, as firm 
size in terms of total assets increases, the audit fees of firms with advanced IT capabilities increase at a greater rate than the audit fees 
of firms without advanced IT capabilities. At the same time, we find no evidence that IT capability moderates the impact of client 
complexity or risk on audit fees.
This paper contributes to the accounting literature in two areas: First, while a stream of research examining the use of IT by 
auditors in their work exists (for example, Fischer, 1996; Behn et al., 2006; Janvrin et al., 2008; Dowling, 2009; Chang et al., 2011; 
Alles, 2015; Cao et al., 2015; Axelsen et al., 2017), there is little scholarly work that examines the impact of a client's IT capability on 
audit pricing. Given the prevalence of IT as a foundation of most modern accounting information systems (AIS), understanding the 
role of the client's IT capability on the cost of external assurance is highly relevant. Prior studies (Masli et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014) 
focus on year-to-year audit fee increases, while we focus on audit fee magnitude in a given year. We also extend the Chen et al. (2014) 
results beyond the immediate post-SOX period and observe that their finding of smaller audit fee increases for advanced IT-capability 
companies does not persist beyond 2007. This suggests that clients with strong IT capabilities adapted more quickly to SOX com­
pliance, exhibited by these smaller audit fee increases. This also may imply that these companies adapt better to exogenous events 
such as new regulations.
This paper's second area of contribution to the accounting literature concerns the impact of IT on the audit profession. The link 
between client IT capability and audit cost suggests that audit firms can extract higher fees from firms with greater IT complexity, and 
that firm size amplifies this effect. Given the continuing investment in advanced IT by most major companies, this particular finding 
raises cost concerns for both clients and auditors. This finding should be of interest to practitioners as they increase the use of IT 
auditors during financial statement audits (Axelsen et al., 2017). This finding should also be of interest to client managers as they seek 
to understand the relationship between IT complexity and audit fees.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The second section presents the literature review, which leads to the paper's 
hypotheses. The third section summarizes the sample used and methodology employed. The fourth section presents the results of our 
analysis. The fifth section discusses the study's findings and implications and limitations; suggestions for further inquiry are also 
included in this final section.
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development
2.1. Theoretical framework
2.1.1. IT capability
The IT capability construct draws its theoretical foundation from strategic management's resource-based view (RBV) of the firm 
(Barney, 1991; Mata et al., 1995). RBV conceptualizes the firm as sets of resources and suggests that the nature of these resources and 
how firms choose to deploy them drives firm performance. Investments in technology, combined with IT management skills and 
knowledge, yields IT capabilities (Kohli and Grover, 2008; Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien, 2005). The results of empirical re­
search on IT's performance impact vary depending on performance measures chosen and the time period examined (Bharadwaj, 
2000; Santhanam and Hartono, 2003; Chae et al., 2014). Part of the measurement challenge is that IT capability drives direct and 
indirect impacts of IT investments on firm performance (Masli et al., 2011).
As a construct, IT capability reflects a firm's ability to conceive, create and operate IT in support of business strategies and 
objectives. Scholars have suggested that IT capability impacts a firm at different levels. The most basic level is to collect and provide 
information to managers, while progressively more advanced approaches automate existing operations. At the most strategic level, IT 
transforms the business (Dehning et al., 2003). IT capability is likely to influence financial reporting and the financial statement audit 
(Axelsen et al., 2017) and require the use of IT auditors, who generally receive higher compensation (Half, 2015).
2.1.2. IT capability and the financial statement audit
Client size is the primary driver of the audit effort and the associated cost (Hay et al., 2006; Simunic, 1980). Large companies 
were the first to employ IT primarily to reduce the costs of labor-intensive recordkeeping (Accenture, 2005). For many years, auditors 
were nonplussed by their clients' IT innovations and chose to “audit around” the system. As IT matured, its applications expanded 
beyond simple bookkeeping. Eventually, businesses of all sizes began to incorporate IT throughout their operations. Gradually a 
client's IT came within the scope of the audit. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 48, The Effects of Computer Processing on the 
Audit of Financial Statements, was the first auditing standard to address IT's impact on the financial statement audit (AICPA, 1984).
As a company's use of technology advances, the relationship between client IT capability and the financial statement audit 
becomes more direct. Singleton (2010) notes that “...guidance (SAS No. 94) suggests the effect of IT is not necessarily related to the 
size of the entity but rather the level of sophistication of its IT (pg. 1).” An advanced client IT environment provides both advantages 
and disadvantages for the audit team. A strong client IT environment may support advanced data analytics, continuous auditing 
capabilities and other systems that can assist auditors in their work (Deloitte, 2015; PWC, 2015). Additionally, to the extent that the 
client's IT capability lowers the risk of IT-related material weaknesses, audit costs may be reduced (Canada et al., 2009).
Conversely, advanced IT environments, characterized by multiple operating systems, complex networks and disparate applica­
tions, create variability in audit planning and may result in less structured audit processes (Stoel et al., 2012). Changes to a firm's 
enterprise systems environment can significantly alter internal controls and audit procedures (Kanellou and Spathis, 2011). Ad­
ditionally, those system changes can potentially increase the level of audit effort and the need for auditors with specialized IT 
expertise.
As a company's IT sophistication increases, the need for specialized audit resources grows. Curtis et al. (2009) note that “Factors 
that suggest the need for [IT] specialists include: system complexity and usage, system changes or implementations, the extent of data 
sharing, the extent of the client's involvement in e-commerce, the client's use of emerging technologies, and the extent to which audit 
evidence is only available in electronic form (pg. 85).” Clients with advanced IT capabilities possess many of these attributes and, 
thus, require expanded IT auditor involvement. Further, research suggests that financial statement auditors possessing IT expertise 
tend to assess higher IT control risks than auditors lacking this experience (Brazel and Agoglia, 2007). Finally, specialized IT auditors 
command a 22% or higher audit fee premium compared to financial statement auditors (Half, 2015). Thus, while clients with 
advanced IT capabilities might achieve greater audit efficiency for routine analysis and testing, the client's use of advanced tech­
nology may incur additional effort and risk and, in turn, require more resources, such as specialized and highly compensated staff, 
from their auditors.
2.1.3. IT capability and audit pricing
Auditors plan their attest engagements to provide interested stakeholders with reasonable assurance of the veracity of the client's 
financial statements. There appears to be a desirable range for audit fees: excessively high fees may lead clients to switch to a certified 
public accountant (CPA) firm that offers a better fit (Shu, 2000). Clients, however, are not exclusively focused on minimizing audit 
cost. For instance, positive corporate governance factors such as Board of Director expertise, independence and effort may lead to the 
board's desire for a more thorough audit. Therefore, these factors may lead to increased audit fees (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 
2003).
Prior research suggests that a company's IT capability impacted audit fee changes during the post-SOX period (Masli et al., 2010; 
Chen et al., 2014). Chen et al. (2014) reported that while there was a general increase in audit fees, for the time period 2004 through 
2007, the rate of audit fee increases was less (9.1%) for companies with strong IT capabilities than for companies without strong IT 
capabilities. This research did not address this effect's persistence beyond the post-SOX period, nor did it explore the question of how 
a client's IT capability is associated with audit fee levels in a given year. In summary, prior research has explored the impact of client 
IT capability on post-SOX year-to-year audit efficiency measured by changes in audit fees, but not on the broader issue of the 
relationship between client IT capability and audit fee magnitude. Thus, we hypothesize about the relationship between IT capability 
and the audit fee level in a given year, and explore how this relationship persists throughout the timeframe of our study.
2.2. Hypothesis development
2.2.1. IT capability and audit fees
As discussed above, companies and their stakeholders desire a timely and cost-effective audit. Typical audit fees have more than 
doubled post-SOX (Raghunandan and Rama, 2006). Prior research suggests that IT is a fundamental element of an effective internal 
control environment, necessary for managing financial reporting (Klamm et al., 2012). Audit firms also rely on technology when 
performing their audits. These firms leverage IT to: automate their documentation (Janvrin et al. 2008), make their processes more 
consistent (Dowling and Leech, 2014) and understand client systems and business processes (Janvrin et al., 2009). Thus, one would 
expect that companies with advanced IT capabilities would leverage IT to implement strong internal controls. This would cause the 
auditor to assess control risk at a lower level and rely more on the client's internal controls to make the audit more efficient and less 
costly (Janvrin et al. 2009).
Furthermore, some managers may view their companies' transaction processing and financial reporting capabilities as a strategic 
asset; they may invest a portion of their IT development efforts with the goal of making these core business processes more effective 
and efficient. In turn, that investment may make the financial statement audit less costly (Christ et al., 2015). Specifically, superior IT 
capability may reduce costs by making data more readily available and lowering risk through automation of internal controls 
(Janvrin et al. 2009; Masli et al., 2010). It also may mute the increases in audit fees from one year to the next (Chen et al., 2014).
Conversely, firms with advanced IT capabilities may require increased audit efforts, driven by the expanded scope and complexity 
of the technology environment. For example, Chen (2001) discusses the challenges experienced in the initial wave of enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) implementations. These challenges included selecting appropriate software, matching business requirements 
with IT capabilities, and successfully changing the organizational structure and employee behavior to effectively utilize the system. 
These issues likely would add the complexity of the audit, increasing audit effort. Axelsen et al. (2017) state that financial statement 
auditors struggle with clearly understanding the role of the information systems auditors and how best to use them during the 
financial statement audit. Challenges such as these are likely to lead to a more complex auditing environment for the external auditor, 
which is likely to lead to higher audit fees.
Relevant audit risks are not limited to a client's internal IT environment. Managers may choose to outsource a portion of their IT 
operations to obtain access to specialized expertise and reduce costs. In making this choice, firms may lose the ability to adequately 
monitor those outsourced IT functions. Thus, to the extent that those functions are integral to the financial reporting process, firms 
may incur additional risk (Christ et al., 2015).
Regardless of the mix of insourced and outsourced resources, the capability to deploy pervasive and innovative technologies may 
increase business performance, but not necessarily reduce or eliminate risks to the company. Arguably the reduction of these types of 
business risks requires a management focus more on internal controls than on advanced IT capability. Absent a strong internal control 
focus, expanding technology portfolios may increase audit effort and costs.
As previously noted, auditors with IT expertise are significantly more expensive than their traditional auditor counterparts with 
financial statement expertise (Axelsen et al., 2017). Whether there are resulting audit efficiency gains that offset these additional 
costs is unclear.
Thus, conflicting arguments exist regarding the impact of client IT capability on audit pricing. Advanced IT capability may 
support enhanced operations, analytics and internal controls, all of which reduce audit fees. Conversely, advanced IT capability may 
increase operational complexity and risk with an associated increase in audit fees. Additionally, complex client IT environments 
require the use of specialized IT auditor resources that are costlier. This leads to our hypothesis, stated in the null form:
H1:. There will be no significant association between audit client IT capability and the level of the client's audit fees.
3. Data and methods
3.1. IT capability proxy: InformationWeek 500
The InformationWeek 500 (IW500) is an annual list that identifies U.S. companies with superior IT functions. Membership on this 
list has been used as a proxy measure for superior IT capability by numerous prior studies (Bharadwaj, 2000; Santhanam and 
Hartono, 2003; Bhatt and Grover, 2005; Wang and Alam, 2007; Muhanna and Stoel, 2010; Chen, Lim and Stratopoulos, 2011; Chen 
et al., 2014; Chae et al., 2014). To be considered for this list, companies must have annual revenue of at least $250 million 
(InformationWeek, 2011). In making their selections, the editors look for a “demonstrated pattern of technological, procedural and 
organizational innovation” (InformationWeek, 2011).
3.2. Sample selection
Our sample consists of U.S.-based, SEC-registered companies for the years 2004 through 2012. This timeframe was chosen to span 
the post-SOX, financial recession, and recovery periods.1 Beginning the sample with the year 2004, permits the inclusion of SOX- 
related reporting of internal control weaknesses.2
1 The majority of the SOX requirements were effective by the end of 2003 (see https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf). The financial recession spanned 
December 2007 through June 2009 (see http://www.nber.org/cycles.html).
2 Our sample ends in 2012, due to changes made by Information Week regarding the methodology used to determine the IW500.
3 We start data collection in the year 2000 in order to have five years of data prior to the study's timeframe, 2004 through 2012. This earlier data is needed to 
compute IW500Repeat, a variable used in a subsequent additional analysis.
4 This method is appropriate in our setting given the strong correlation between audit fees and IT capability. Using this approach controls for bias in our coefficients 
if the unmodeled effects of audit fees are related to IT capability.
5 This matching process was performed with no replacement of the control firm-year observations.
6 We also matched on 3-digit and 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes; our results were qualitatively similar to our main results. See the breakdown 
of our IW500 and population-based control sample firm-year observations by industry in Appendix B.
Data are drawn from the databases of Audit Analytics and Compustat. Consistent with prior work, we removed financial services 
firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 6000-6999) from the sample (Francis and Wang, 2005); we also removed 
companies with less than $250 million in annual revenue, based upon the IW500 requirement stated earlier. We eliminated those 
companies lacking the needed information for our variables. Companies, cited in the annual InformationWeek 500 report for the years 
2000 through 2012, were identified and coded as having superior IT capability.3 Finally, we matched the IW500 data with the 
corresponding years 2004 through 2012 timeframe of audit and financial data.
This results in a sample of 2025 firm-year observations with audit fee data for firms with superior IT capability (IW500) and 
14,921 firm-year observations in the population-based control sample. Our final sample was constructed via propensity score 
matching to alleviate any concerns with structural issues in the data including the possibility of nonlinear relations among variables 
that could compromise the validity of our results (Shipman et al., 2017).4 The propensity score was calculated based on the predicted 
probabilities of selection as an IW500 firm, using the probit model in the Eq. (0) below. The variables in our model are derived from 
prior literature related to the determinants of IT capability and innovation that drive the inclusion of a firm on the IW500 list 
(Kobelsky et al., 2008; Masli et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014).
(0)
As a result, we employed a matched-pair sample of 4050 firm-year observations for our primary analysis.5 For the additional 
analyses and robustness checks, we employed a population-based control sample of 14,921 firm-year observations and had 2025 
IW500 firm-year observations. These control firms are limited to the industries in the sample of IW500 firms (based on the firms' 
three-digit SIC codes).6
3.3. Research design
Our multivariate analysis uses superior IT capability (IW500) as its variable of interest and includes controls for various client and 
auditor factors from prior audit fee models (Francis and Wang, 2005; Raghunandan and Rama, 2006; Masli et al., 2010). Consistent 
with prior work, we included industry (two-digit SIC) and year-fixed effects; our continuous data is winsorized at 1 and 99% to 
mitigate the influence of outliers, and we centered continuous variables (Robinson and Schumacker, 2009). Following Chen et al. 
(2014), we report robust standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009). We use the following OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
regression model to test H1:
(1)
The dependent variable Audit Feest = the log of audit fees for year t. Our independent variable of interest is IW500 = 1, for a firm 
included in the InformationWeek 500 report; 0 is otherwise used. The remaining variables control for firm size, complexity, risk, 
financial performance and auditor size. See Appendix A for a description of the control variables.
Extant models of audit pricing generally follow Simunic (1980) and employ measures of client risk, client complexity and client 
size as the three primary determinants of audit fees. In their meta-analysis of audit fee research, spanning the years 1977 through 
2003, Hay et al. (2006) report that client size, as measured by total assets, client risk, as measured by Rec_Inventory or Leverage, and 
client complexity, as measured by Segments, are the primary determinants of audit fees. Therefore, we interact our variable of interest, 
IW500, with these well-established proxies as an additional analysis. See Eq. (2) below.
(2)
Our control variables remain consistent with Eq. (1).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: IW500 firms vs. Non-IW500 firms — population-based control sample
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Variable Mean Median Std. dev. P Mean Differ.
IW500 firms Non-IW500 firms
Audit Fees 1.318 1.301 0.998 Audit Fees 0.585 0.494 0.960 < 0.001
Assets 8.687 8.634 1.423 Assets 7.593 7.393 1.479 < 0.001
Rec_Inventory 0.237 0.215 0.161 Rec_Inventory 0.238 0.213 0.162 0.846
ForeignTrans 0.990 1.000 0.099 ForeignTrans 0.994 1.000 0.079 0.059
Segments 3.077 3.000 2.176 Segments 2.913 2.000 2.390 0.004
Liquidity 1.689 1.474 0.897 Liquidity 2.072 1.741 1.308 < 0.001
Leverage 0.244 0.234 0.164 Leverage 0.255 0.233 0.202 0.021
ROA 0.046 0.049 0.080 ROA 0.045 0.048 0.089 0.638
GoingConcern 0.011 0.000 0.104 GoingConcern 0.007 0.000 0.084 0.061
Big4 0.979 1.000 0.144 Big4 0.938 1.000 0.241 < 0.001
Weakness 0.039 0.000 0.194 Weakness 0.053 0.000 0.223 0.009
n = 2025
Panel B: IW500 firms
Variable
IW500 firms
Audit Fees
Assets
Rec_Inventory
ForeignTrans
Segments
Liquidity
Leverage
ROA
GoingConcern
Big4 
Weakness 
n = 2025
vs. Non-IW
Mean
1.325
8.693
0.237
0.990
3.078
1.689
0.244
0.046
0.011
0.979
0.039
500 matched
Median
1.299
8.633
0.215
1.000
3.000
1.474
0.234
0.049
0.000
1.000
0.000
-pair sample firms
Std. dev.
0.996
1.420
0.161
0.099
2.178
0.897
0.164
0.080
0.104
0.144
0.194
n = 14921
Variable
Matched firms
Audit Fees 
Assets 
Rec_Inventory 
ForeignTrans 
Segments 
Liquidity 
Leverage 
ROA
GoingConcern 
Big4 
Weakness 
n = 2025
Mean
1.139
8.671
0.238
0.994
3.062
1.649
0.251
0.044
0.013
0.984
0.036
Median
1.061
8.643
0.213
1.000
2.000
1.450
0.235
0.046
0.000
1.000
0.000
Std. dev.
1.024
1.538
0.169
0.080
2.498
0.880
0.171
0.086
0.113
0.125
0.186
P Mean Differ.
< 0.001
0.729
0.858
0.221
0.840
0.147
0.184
0.385
0.561
0.199
0.620
All variables are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99% to mitigate the influence of outliers. P Mean Differ. is 
the p-value of the difference in means between the IW500 firms and the Non-IW500 firms.
4. Results
4.1. Univariate analysis
Table 1 reports descriptive information about the variables used in our analysis. Panel A compares IW500 firms with the po­
pulation-based control sample of non-IW500 firms. The following differences are significant (p < 0.05). The IW500 firms have 
higher audit fees, shown in millions, with a mean (median) of 1.32 (1.30) contrasted with 0.58 (0.49) for the control sample. 
Companies in the IW500 are generally larger, with a mean size (Assets) of 8.69 versus 7.59 for the control sample. The IW500 
companies are also more complex, with a mean number of geographic segments of 3.08 versus 2.91 for the control sample. Also, the 
IW500 companies are less leveraged (with a mean value of 0.24 versus 0.25 for the control sample) and less liquid (with a mean value 
of 1.69 versus 2.07 for the control sample). The companies in the IW500 utilize Big 4 firms for their audits at a higher rate than the 
rest of the sample, 98% compared to 94%, and these same companies report fewer material control weaknesses, 4% versus 5%. We do 
not find any statistically significant differences between the IW500 and non-IW500 firms in combined levels of receivables and 
inventory, which was one of our two proxies for risk. Finally, the IW500 firms produce a similar Return on Assets (mean ROA of 
approximately 5%).
Panel B compares the IW500 firms with the matched-pair control group and reveals a well-matched sample, given that none of the 
control variables are significantly different across the two groups. The only significant difference between the two groups is audit fees 
(1.32 versus 1.14). This univariate result is an initial indication that audit fees are higher for IW500 firms versus non-IW500 firms.
The matched-pairs sample correlation coefficients for the variables used in our main results are reported in Table 2. Reviewing the 
correlation among the variables, we find a significant and positive correlation between IW500 and Audit Fees, suggesting audit fees 
are higher for clients with superior IT capabilities. This provides initial support for H1. The correlations between IW500 and the 
remaining independent variables suggest that larger, riskier, more complex companies tend to have superior IT capabilities. These 
IW500 firms are also more likely to have a material weakness, more likely to use a Big 4 auditor and less likely to be issued a going 
concern opinion. Furthermore, audit fees tend to be higher for larger, more complex, less liquid and more leveraged companies. Fees
Table 2
Correlation matrix.
IW500 Audit Fees Assets Rec_Inventory ForeignTrans Segments Liquidity Leverage ROA GoingConcem Big4 Weakness
IW500 1.000 0.088 0.758 0.044 -0.122 0.328 -0.004 0.013 0.004 -0.193 0.107 0.061
(< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.006) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.801) (0.403) (0.783) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Audit Fees 0.093 1.000 0.005 -0.021 -0.003 0.003 -0.019 0.014 -0.009 0.023 -0.020 0.008
(< 0.001) (0.729) (0.184) (0.858) (0.841) (0.221) (0.385) (0.562) (0.147) (0.200) (0.620)
Assets 0.747 0.004 1.000 0.137 -0.390 0.158 -0.009 0.097 -0.023 -0.312 0.135 -0.085
(< 0.001) (0.821) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.567) (< 0.001) (0.140) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Rec_inventory 0.064 -0.017 0.165 1.000 -0.269 -0.102 -0.005 -0.297 0.063 -0.321 0.056 0.009
(< 0.001) (0.284) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.740) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.574)
ForeignTrans -0.075 0.010 -0.379 -0.290 1.000 0.064 0.024 0.006 -0.006 0.273 -0.070 0.078
(< 0.001) (0.531) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.125) (0.692) (0.721) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001)
Segments 0.355 0.048 0.111 -0.148 0.203 1.000 0.000 0.037 0.027 0.161 0.041 0.004
(< 0.001) (0.002) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.983) (0.019) (0.086) (< 0.001) (0.009) (0.792)
Liquidity -0.003 -0.019 -0.006 -0.006 0.029 -0.003 1.000 0.010 -0.015 0.023 -0.012 -0.011
(0.846) (0.221) (0.717) (0.680) (0.063) (0.865) (0.510) (0.326) (0.136) (0.428) (0.484)
Leverage 0.024 0.016 0.059 -0.368 0.107 0.124 0.033 1.000 -0.278 0.131 0.030 -0.132
(0.128) (0.303) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.036) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.059) (< 0.001)
ROA 0.006 -0.009 -0.023 0.049 -0.004 0.031 -0.015 -0.157 1.000 -0.049 0.015 0.098
(0.686) (0.562) (0.143) (0.002) (0.809) (0.052) (0.326) (< 0.001) (0.002) (0.339) (< 0.001)
GoingConcem -0.178 0.027 -0.364 -0.387 0.436 0.248 0.026 0.190 -0.066 1.000 -0.053 -0.007
(< 0.001) (0.089) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.102) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.001) (0.675)
Big4 0.109 -0.020 0.131 0.060 -0.074 0.030 -0.012 0.040 0.015 -0.064 1.000 0.008
(< 0.001) (0.200) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.055) (0.428) (0.011) (0.339) (< 0.001) (0.617)
Weakness 0.057 0.008 -0.088 0.004 0.074 0.007 -0.011 -0.129 0.098 0.006 0.008 1.000
(< 0.001) (0.620) (< 0.001) (0.784) (< 0.001) (0.676) (0.484) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.700) (0.617)
All variables are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99% to mitigate the influence of outliers. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented in the upper right 
(lower left). p-Values are in parentheses below each correlation coefficient. This matrix is based on the matched-pair sample; there are 4050 observations, consistent with those shown in Table 1, Panel B.
Table 3
The impact of IT capability on audit fees.
Panel A: IW500
Dependent variables: Audit Fees Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Variable Pred. Coeff. p value Coeff. p value
Intercept -0.320 0.025 -0.293 0.04
IW500 ? 0.183 < 0.001 0.141 < 0.001
Assets + 0.549 < 0.001 0.527 < 0.001
Leverage + -0.155 0.134 -0.084 0.453
Rec_inventory + 0.082 < 0.001 1.032 < 0.001
Segments + 0.011 0.925 0.088 < 0.001
IW500 * Assets ? 0.043 0.038
IW500 * Leverage ? -0.141 0.412
IW500* Rec_Inv ? -0.009 0.492
IW500 * Segments ? -0.016 0.933
ForeignTrans + -0.804 < 0.001 0.011 0.925
ROA — -0.075 0.464 -0.794 < 0.001
GoingConcem + 1.038 < 0.001 -0.079 0.445
Liquidity — -0.022 0.220 -0.023 0.195
Big4 + 0.046 0.571 0.039 0.633
Weakness + 0.575 < 0.001 0.577 < 0.001
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 67.68% 67.72%
Number of observations 4050 4050
Degrees of freedom 19 23
F 172.98 154.24
p for model < 0.001 < 0.001
Panel B: IW500Repeat
Dependent variables: Audit Fees Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Variable Pred. Coeff. p value Coeff. p value
Intercept -0.303 0.033 -0.268 0.055
IW500Repeat ? 0.055 < 0.001 0.036 0.001
Assets + 0.538 < 0.001 0.507 < 0.001
Leverage + -0.143 0.165 -0.075 0.477
Rec_Inventory + 0.084 < 0.001 0.943 < 0.001
Segments + 0.003 0.977 0.086 < 0.001
IW500Repeat * Assets ? 0.019 0.004
IW500Repeat * Leverage ? -0.033 0.569
IW500Repeat * Rec_Inv ? 0.000 0.961
IW500Repeat * Segments ? 0.025 0.665
ForeignTrans + -0.787 < 0.001 0.009 0.936
ROA — -0.059 0.555 -0.780 < 0.001
GoingConcem + 0.988 < 0.001 -0.063 0.538
(continued on next page)
Table 3 (continued)
Panel B: IW500Repeat
Dependent variables: Audit Fees Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Variable Pred. Coeff. p value Coeff. p value
Liquidity - -0.020 0.257 -0.022 0.225
Big4 + 0.039 0.644 0.026 0.753
Weakness + 0.571 < 0.001 0.573 < 0.001
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 67.99% 68.11%
Number of observations 4050 4050
Degrees of freedom 19 23
F 171.26 155.93
p for model < 0.001 < 0.001
All variables are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99% to mitigate the influence of outliers.
are also higher when a company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and when material weaknesses are present in their internal controls.
4.2. Multivariate analysis
The regression coefficients for Eqs. (1) and (2) appear in Table 3, Panel A; this panel uses the propensity score matched-pair 
sample, previously described. Evaluating the base model, we find that, consistent with prior research (Francis and Wang, 2005; 
Raghunandan and Rama, 2006; Masli et al., 2010), the control variables are generally significant in the predicted direction in for both 
Eqs. (1) and (2). Total assets, receivables and inventory, number of business segments and SOX 404 material weaknesses have a 
positive and significant relationship with the level of audit fees; ROA and liquidity have a negative and significant relationship. 
Contrary to expectations, leverage, foreign transactions, going concern opinion and utilization of Big 4 auditors are not significantly 
related to the level of audit fees. The variance inflation factor (VIF) values for all equations are all < 10, indicating that multi­
collinearity does not appear to be an issue (Belsley et al., 1980).
We test our hypothesis in Column 1 of Table 3, Panel A: IW500, the variable of interest, is significant and positive (0.183, 
p < 0.001). Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of H1. The results suggest that having superior IT capability is associated with a 
higher level of audit fees.
To better understand the direct effect of IT capability on audit fees while controlling for interactions with these key audit fee 
determinants (Aiken and West, 1991), we interact IW500 with proxies for Simunic's (1980) three components of audit pricing: size 
(Assets), complexity (Segments) and risk (Rec_Inventory and Leverage). As shown in Table 3, Panel A — Column 2, the main effect of 
IW500 remains significant and positive (0.141, p < 0.001). The interaction of IW500 with size (Assets) is significant and positive 
(0.043, p = 0.038). We find that IW500 interactions with our risk measures (Leverage and Rec_Inventory) and complexity measure 
(Segments) are insignificant. The findings suggest that a company's size moderates the influence of IT capability on audit fees.
Taken together, the results in Table 3, Panel A suggest that superior IT capability impacts audit pricing in two ways: 1) the overall 
direct effect is that audit fees for a client with superior IT capability are approximately 4% higher than audit fees for a control firm; 
and 2) the interaction analysis (IW500 * Assets) reveals that IT capability has a stronger positive influence on audit fees as the firm 
size increases.
4.3. Additional analyses
4.3.1. IW500Repeat
Chen et al. (2011) indicate the potential pitfalls of viewing a firm that was recognized once in the InformationWeek 500 as having 
equivalent IT impact with those firms that have been repeatedly recognized. We therefore construct an alternative proxy for superior 
IT capability: IW500Repeat. This variable counts the number of times companies have been recognized by the InformationWeek 500 
for their superior IT capabilities during the current year and preceding four years. Thus, we replaced IW500 with IW500Repeat as the 
variable of interest in Eqs. (1) and (2):
Audit Feest = β0 + β1 IW500Repeatt + β2 Assetst + β3 Leveraget + β4 Segmentst + β5 ForeignTranst + β6 ROAt
+ β7 GoingConcernt + β8 RecInventoryt+1 + β9 Liquidity + β 10 Big4t + β 11 Weaknesst + ε (3)
Audit Feest = β0 + β 1 IW500Repeatt + β2 Assetst + β3 Leveraget + β4 Segments + β5 IW500Repeat* Assetst
+ β6 IW500Repeat* Leveraget + β7 IW500Repeat* RecInventoryt +1 + β8IW500* Segmentst + β9 ForeignTranst
+ β 10 ROAt + β 11 GoingConcernt + β 12 RecInventoryt+1 + β 13 Liquidity + β 14 Big4t + β 15 Weaknesst + ε (4)
We, again, centered continuous variables (Robinson and Schumacker, 2009). Following Chen et al. (2014), we report robust 
standard errors clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009). Also, the VIF values computed for Eqs. (3) and (4) are all < 10, indicating that 
multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue (Belsley et al., 1980).
We report these results in Table 3, Panel B. These analyses yield similar results to Panel A: in Eq. (3), there is a positive and 
significant value for IW500Repeat (0.055, p < 0.001); in Eq. (4), there are positive and significant values for IW500Repeat (0.036, 
p = 0.001) and IW500Repeat * Assets (0.019, p = 0.004). These results also support rejecting the H1 null hypothesis in the same 
direction as our main results.
4.3.2. Revisiting Chen et al. (2014)
Prior findings from Chen et al. (2014) and Masli et al. (2010) suggest, during the post-SOX period, clients with advanced IT 
capabilities have smaller rates of audit fee increase when compared with similar clients without strong IT capabilities. Given those 
outcomes, the findings reported above seem counterintuitive. As stated earlier, these prior studies are examining year-to-year audit 
efficiency measured by changes in audit fees, while our study measures audit fee levels in a given year. In addition, the Chen et al. 
(2014) results support two alternative views of the general impact of client IT capability on audit fees. First, clients with strong IT 
functions may have smaller increases in fees on their audits, ceteris paribus, than similar clients without strong IT capabilities. 
Alternatively, clients with strong IT functions may be better able to quickly adapt to exogenous events such as new regulations, and 
thus have smaller post-SOX audit fee increases than similarly situated companies lacking strong IT capabilities. This second line of 
reasoning is consistent with prior research that found strong IT capability increased a firm's ability to quickly recover from a financial
Table 4
The impact of IT capability on audit fee changes by time period.
Dependent variable: ∆Audit Fees
Panel A
Variable Pred. Post-SOX Recession Recovery
2004-2007 2008-2009 2010-2012
Coeff. p value Coeff. p value Coeff. p value
Intercept 0.757 < 0.001 -0.041 0.404 0.036 0.444
IW500 -0.105 < 0.001 -0.006 0.539 0.012 0.386
∆Assets + 0.143 0.006 3.590 < 0.001 2.750 < 0.001
ALeverage + -0.001 0.184 0.000 0.599 0.000 0.084
∆RecJnventory + 0.040 0.529 0.056 0.02 0.074 0.043
∆Segments + -0.042 0.087 0.002 0.830 -0.011 0.045
ForeignTrans + 0.046 0.058 0.047 0.192 0.023 0.440
∆ROA 0.093 0.446 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.752
GoingConcem + -0.038 0.525 0.059 0.175 0.608 0.290
∆Liquidity 0.000 0.241 -0.017 0.516 -0.042 0.013
Big4 + -0.220 < 0.001 -0.051 0.142 -0.027 0.482
Weakness + 4.543 < 0.001 -0.021 0.628 0.189 0.04
Y2005 ? -0.594 < 0.001 0.056
Y2006 ? -0.699 < 0.001 0.032
Y2007 ? -0.699 < 0.001
Y2009 ? 0.019 0.087
Y2011 ? 0.024
Y2012 ? 0.025
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 15.72% 12.40% 4.83%
Number of observations 8012 3542 5392
Degrees of freedom 14 12 13
F 113.54 7.53 6.57
p for model
Dependent variable: Audit Fees
Panel B
Variable
Intercept
IW500
Assets
< 0.001
Pred. Post-SOX
2004-2007
Coeff.
-0.415
0.200
+ 0.486
< 0.001 < 0.001
Recession Recovery
2008-2009 2010-2012
p value Coeff. p value Coeff. p value
< 0.001 -0.120 0.615 -0.340 0.002
< 0.001 0.175 < 0.001 0.178 < 0.001
< 0.001 0.486 < 0.001 0.495 < 0.001
(continued on next page)
Table 4 (continued)
Dependent variable: Audit Fees
Panel B
Variable Pred. Post-SOX Recession Recovery
2004-2007 2008-2009 2010-2012
Coeff. p value Coeff. p value Coeff. p value
Leverage + 0.063 0.375 -0.083 0.221 -0.181 0.006
Rec_Inventory + 0.899 < 0.001 1.025 < 0.001 0.962 < 0.001
Segments + 0.100 < 0.001 0.077 < 0.001 0.058 < 0.001
ForeignTrans + -0.032 0.745 -0.047 0.840 0.067 0.510
ROA -0.961 < 0.001 -0.522 < 0.001 -0.697 < 0.001
GoingConcem + 0.151 0.140 0.062 0.446 0.131 0.420
Liquidity -0.025 0.009 -0.011 0.281 -0.014 0.114
Big4 + 0.189 < 0.001 0.228 < 0.001 0.236 < 0.001
Weakness + 0.556 < 0.001 0.336 < 0.001 0.250 < 0.001
Y2005 ? 0.291 < 0.001
Y2006 ? 0.341 < 0.001
Y2007 ? 0.325 < 0.001
Y2009 ? -0.064 < 0.001
Y2011 ? -0.012 0.1274
Y2012 ? 0.008 0.4064
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 63.20% 67.38% 69.23%
Number of observations 8012 3542 5392
Degrees of freedom 14 12 13
F 421.17 347.59 359.14
p for model < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
All variables are defined in the appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99% to mitigate the influence of outliers.
downturn (Wu et al., 2014; Schäfferling et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2011).
We explore these alternative interpretations with a two-step analysis. Following recent calls for more robust efforts to substantiate 
prior findings (Stone, 2015; Salterio, 2014), we begin by replicating the main findings of Chen et al. (2014). Specifically, we use the 
OLS regression Eq. (5) below to test whether clients with advanced IT capabilities will see a lower rate of post-SOX audit fee increases 
compared to clients without advanced IT capabilities.
ΔAuditFeest = β0 + β 1 IW500t + β2 ΔAssetst + β3 ΔLeveraget + β4 ΔSegmentst + β5 ForeignTranst + β6 ΔROAt
+ β 7 GoingConcernt + β 8 Δ RecInventoryt+1 + β 9 Δ Liquidityt + β 10 Big4t + β 11 Weaknesst + controls industry &year
+ ε (5)
The regression analysis results using Eq. (5) appear in Table 4, Panel A. We find that IW500 is negative and significant (-0.105, 
p < 0.001). Consistent with Chen et al. (2014); during the post-SOX period, companies with superior IT capabilities have smaller 
increases in audit fees compared to companies lacking strong IT capabilities during the years 2004 through 2007.
As a second step, we examine the persistence of the Chen et al. (2014) findings as the audit profession absorbed the regulatory 
impact of SOX. This is captured by testing whether differences in the rate of post-SOX audit fee changes between clients with 
advanced IT capabilities and clients without advanced IT capabilities attenuate as the SOX requirements are addressed and met.
We find insignificant coefficients for IW500 during the recession period (-0.006, p = 0.539) and the recovery period (0.012, 
p = 0.386); see Table 4, Panel A for details. These results place the Masli et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2014) findings in a broader 
context: they suggest that clients with advanced IT capabilities were better able to minimize audit fee increases immediately after 
SOX was implemented. This difference, however, dissipated after the immediate post-SOX period.
At the same time, post-SOX, during the years 2004 through 2007, audit fees were consistently higher for strong IT capability 
companies. These results appear in Table 4, Panel B. We find that post-SOX IW500 is positive and significant (0.200, p < 0.001). We 
find similar results for IW500 during the recession, covering the years 2008 through 2009, (0.175, p < 0.001) and recovery, cov­
ering the years 2010 through 2012, (0.178, p < 0.001). This illustrates the idea that, although the influence of client IT capability is 
associated with smaller year-to-year audit fee growth (Chen et al., 2014), clients with superior IT capability also have significantly 
higher audit fees in a given year.
4.4. Robustness checks
We employed several alternative analyses (untabulated) to verify the robustness of the results. First, we used two alternative 
approaches for constructing the matched-pair sample: 1) matching on the four fee determinants (Size, Leverage, Rec_Inventory and 
Segments) and 2) matching on size and two-digit SIC code. From these alternative methods of constructing the control group, the 
results were qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3. We also expanded the construction of the matched-pair sample, 
permitting duplicate control firm-year observations, and found qualitatively similar results to our primary analysis.
Second, we employed a population-based control sample approach following prior research (Doyle et al., 2007; Masli et al., 
2010); the control sample included all of the 14,921 control firm-year observations. This control sample was combined with the 2025 
IW500 firm-year observations and analyzed. When compared with the results reported in Table 3, Panel A, these analyses yield 
similar results: using Eq. (3) there is a positive and significant value for IW500 (0.183, p < 0.001); using Eq. (4) there are positive 
and significant values for IW500 (0.111, p < 0.001) and IW500 * Assets (0.081, p < 0.001). These results also support rejecting the 
H1 null hypothesis in the same direction as our main results.
A possible issue with this population-based control approach is that the companies must apply to be included on the IW500 list. 
Beyond IT prowess, those applying for this recognition may differ from the broader population of companies in systematic ways. To 
address this concern, in a third robustness check, we employed the Heckman (1979) two-stage regression to calculate an inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR). This approach controls for self-selection bias.7 We first modeled the determinants of being included on the IW500 list 
using the following probit model (variables defined in Appendix A):
7 The propensity score matching approach employed in our main analysis deals with functional form misspecification, but does not alleviate bias issues (Shipman 
et al., 2017). Therefore, this two-stage IMR approach is an appropriate robustness check.
Pr (IW500)t = β0 + β1 AuditFeest + β2 Assetst + β3 ForeignTranst + β4 Segmentst + β5 Liquidityt + β6 Leveraget + β7 Big4t
+ β8 ROAt + β9 Restructuringt + β10 Losst + β11 AuditorChanget + β12 AuditDelayt + ε (6)
The variables of Eq. (6) were determined based on prior literature related to IT capability and audit fees (Masli et al., 2010; Chen 
et al., 2014). The included variables were considered likely to have a significant effect on the probability of a company having 
superior IT capability. When running this probit regression, variables that have an insignificant coefficient were then appropriately 
excluded from the second stage regression (Lennox et al., 2012).
Using the estimation results from Eq. (6), we constructed IMR and employed it as an additional control variable in the original Eq. 
(3) model. The inclusion of IMR resulted in Leverage, Big4 and ForeignTrans becoming significant in the direction predicted by prior 
literature as well as an increase in R2 (from 66.89% to 76.28%). The direct effect of IW500 in Eq. (3) remained positive and 
significant (0.048, p < 0.029), providing continued support for rejecting the H1 null hypothesis.
In considering these findings, it is possible that auditors with more robust IT capabilities may service a client with advanced IT 
capability more efficiently and incur lower audit fees. For instance, a sophisticated auditor might leverage a client's advanced IT 
environment to their advantage. Thus, the fourth robustness check explores this alternative by removing non-Big 4 auditors from the 
analysis, reasoning that the Big 4 make extensive IT investments in support of their audit practices and have large IT consulting 
capabilities. In this analysis, IW500 in Eq. (1) remained positive and significant (0.061, p < 0.001). The interaction IW500 * Assets in 
Eq. (2) remained positive and significant (0.026, p < 0.001). This suggests that employing a more sophisticated audit firm does not 
mitigate the higher audit fees experienced by a client with advanced IT capability.
Fifth, as an alternative proxy for size, we considered different filing statuses of firms. We replaced the size variable with a 
dichotomous variable based on the filing status of the firm. When large accelerated filer firms are coded as 1 (0 otherwise), IW500 
remains positive and significant (0.071, p < 0.001). When large accelerated filers and accelerated filers are coded as 1 (0 otherwise) 
IW500 remains positive and significant (0.075, p < 0.001).
In summary, the primary analysis and alternative analyses support rejecting the null hypothesis in the positive direction. We 
consistently find that IT capability impacts audit pricing: companies with stronger IT capabilities have higher audit fees than 
companies with weaker IT capabilities.
5. Summary, limitations, and conclusion
5.1. Summary
Our main findings suggest that clients with strong IT capabilities incur higher audit fees. These results are robust when using 
various alternative measures and models. The results are consistent with current practitioners' observations: sophisticated IT en­
vironments require additional audit effort and the need for more specialized and expensive technical resources from audit firms 
(Abernathy et al., 2013; Half, 2015).
We employ three additional analyses to supplement these findings. First, we interact IT capability with the primary audit fee 
determinants identified in prior literature (Simunic, 1980). We find that firm size has a moderating effect on the association found in 
our primary results; IT capability has a stronger positive association with audit fees for larger firms compared with smaller firms. 
Second, we employ an alternate proxy for superior IT capability, IW500Repeat. This approach measures companies that have con­
sistently demonstrated superior IT capabilities over time. Our results with IW500Repeat are consistent with our primary results with 
IW500. Third, we replicate Chen et al. (2014) and split the results into three time periods. For the post-SOX years 2004 through 2007, 
companies with superior IT capabilities enjoyed smaller increases in audit fees compared to companies lacking strong IT, consistent 
with Chen et al. 2014’s results. This difference, however, is no longer apparent in the data during the respective recession and 
recovery periods of 2008 through 2009 and 2010 through 2012.
5.2. Limitations
Due to data restrictions, this research study does not address if the audit fee impacts were due primarily to more effort (hours), 
more expensive resources (rates), the increased use of specialized IT auditors, or a combination of these factors. Additionally, we do 
not explore how effectively clients' IT systems support and integrate with the external auditor's IT and methodology. Exploring these 
alternatives and attempting to uncover the specific components of IT capability that most impact the audit is an area for future 
research.
We cannot rule out the possibility of omitted correlated variables. Companies with superior IT capabilities may make other 
related decisions or investments that impact audit costs. For example, it is possible that business strategy may be correlated with IT 
capability (Bentley-Goode et al., 2013). Also, the current proxies used for business risk and complexity in typical audit fee models do 
not address IT risk and complexity. Future research might disentangle these effects. Finally, expanding the investigation to include 
non-U.S. markets may provide additional insights on this topic, particularly since companies typically are not subject to internal 
control audit requirements in these environments.
5.3. Conclusion
This paper contributes to auditing and information systems literature in three key ways: First, while prior research finds that 
strong IT capability reduces year-to-year audit fee growth in the post-SOX years (Masli et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014), our findings 
indicate that companies with stronger IT capabilities pay higher audit fees in a given year. Second, our additional analysis suggests a 
revised view of Chen et al. (2014) may be warranted. For instance, it is possible that companies with superior IT capabilities may 
better adapt to exogenous shocks, including new auditing or accounting regulations, than companies that lack strong IT capabilities. 
Subsequently, the difference in audit fee growth attenuates as all companies adapt to the impact of new requirements over time. 
Third, our additional analysis suggests that larger companies with strong IT capabilities will pay disproportionately higher audit fees 
than smaller companies with strong IT capabilities. This diseconomy of scale may be of special interest to large companies with high 
IT sophistication, as they weigh the pros and cons of IT investment. It may also be of interest to the audit firms that audit these 
companies, as the auditors consider the necessary resources needed to audit clients with differing levels of IT capability.
Appendix A. Variable definitions
Dependent variables
Audit Feest = the log of audit fees for year t [“mathchfy_sum_audfees” field in Audit Analytics].
Independent variable
IW500 = 1 for a firm included in the Information Week 500 report; 0 otherwise.
IW500Repeat = count of the number of times in the current and prior four years an IW500 company has been recognized by the 
InformationWeek 500 for their superior IT capability. Range: 1 to 5.
Control variables (listed alphabetically)
Assets = the log of the total assets [“at” field in Compustat in millions].
AuditDelay = total of elapsed days from fiscal year end to filing of 10-k [“sig_date_of_op_s” and “fiscal_year_end_op” fields in Audit 
Analytics].
AuditorChange = 1 if company changes auditors, 0 otherwise [derived using the “auditor_fkey” field in Audit Analytics].
Big4 = 1 if the firm's auditor is a “Big 4” audit firm; 0 otherwise [derived using the “auditor_fkey” field in Audit Analytics].
ForeignTrans = 1 for a firm reporting foreign exchange income or loss; 0 otherwise [“fca” field in Compustat].
GoingConcern = 1 if the firm's auditor issued a going concern opinion; 0 otherwise [“going_concern” field in Audit Analytics].
IMR = Inverse Mills ratio used to control for potential selection bias. See Heckman.
(1979).
Leverage = the ratio of total debt to total assets [(“dltt” + “dlc”)/“at” fields in Compustat].
Liquidity = the current ratio of total current assets divided by total current liabilities [“act”/“lct” fields in Compustat].
Loss = 1 if the firm reported loss; 0 otherwise [calculated using “ni” field in Compustat].
Rec_Inventory = the ratio of the sum of net accounts receivable and inventory to total assets [(“rect”+”invt”)/“at” fields in 
Compustat].
Restructuring = pre-tax restructuring charges scaled by the market value of equity [calculated using “rap”/(“chop” * ”prcc_f”) field 
in Compustat].
ROA = the ratio of net income to total assets [“ni”/“at” fields in Compustat].
Segments = the number of geographic segments [computed from the Compustat segment file].
Weakness = 1 if the firm reported a material weakness; 0 otherwise [calculated using the “count_weak” field in Audit Analytics].
Appendix B. Sample distribution by two-digit SIC code
SIC Description IW500 IW500 % Control Control %
10 Metal, mining 3 0.15% 209 0.73%
13 Oil and gas extraction 22 1.09% 810 5.43%
20 Food and kindred products 56 2.77% 468 3.14%
23 Apparel and other textile products 23 1.14% 185 1.24%
25 Furniture and fixtures 26 1.28% 147 0.99%
26 Paper and allied products 35 1.73% 246 1.65%
27 Printing publishing and allied industries 50 2.47% 207 1.39%
28 Chemicals and allied products 154 7.60% 1105 7.41%
29 Petroleum and coal products 23 1.14% 257 1.72%
33 Primary metal industries 21 1.04% 307 2.06%
34 Fabricated metal products 30 1.48% 170 1.14%
35 Industrial and commercial machinery 149 7.36% 943 6.32%
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment and components 137 6.77% 1319 8.84%
37 Transportation equipment 64 3.16% 446 2.99%
38 Measuring analyzing controlling instruments 84 4.15% 737 4.94%
42 Trucking and warehousing 51 2.52% 125 0.84%
44 Water transportation 8 0.40% 71 0.48%
45 Transportation by air 38 1.88% 200 1.34%
48 Communications 87 4.30% 852 5.71%
49 Electric gas and sanitary services 156 7.70% 1104 7.40%
50 Wholesale trade — durable goods 87 4.30% 362 2.43%
51 Wholesale trade — non-durable goods 35 1.73% 236 1.58%
53 General merchandise stores 17 0.84% 173 1.16%
55 Automotive dealers and service stations 14 0.69% 172 1.15%
56 Apparel and accessory stores 15 0.74% 276 1.85%
58 Eating and drinking places 18 0.89% 305 2.04%
59 Misc. retail 35 1.73% 332 2.23%
70 Hotels and other lodging places 22 1.09% 55 0.37%
73 Business services 290 14.32% 1317 8.83%
79 Amusement and recreation services 25 1.23% 155 1.04%
80 Health services 44 2.17% 285 1.91%
87 Engineering acct research mgmt. and related services 41 2.02% 191 1.28%
All other industries 165 8.12% 1254 8.37%
Total 2025 100.00% 16,627 100.00%
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